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The concept of ontological security has received increased attention in the security studies literature over the past ten years. This 
article develops a critical perspective towards ontological security and its mobilisation by IR scholars, arguing that substantive 
ethical and political resources are produced by resisting the terms of ontological security/insecurity. It argues that the aspiration 
to ontological security, to contiguous and stable narratives of selfhood, can (violently) obscure the ways in which such narratives 
are themselves implicated in power relations. Furthermore it argues that attempts to order political life into an 
ontological/security episteme disciplines or marginalises modes of subjectivity which resist the closure of ontological security-
seeking strategies. The article engages queer figurations of subjectivity as mobilised by Judith Butler, Donna Haraway and 
Jack Halberstam, as well as examples from anti-militarist social movements, to demonstrate traditions which refuse and resist 
the framework of ontological security. It does this both in order to highlight particular practices and strategies that are written 
out by an epistemology oriented around ontological security/insecurity, and to show how a resistance to such ordering can enliven 
political action in various ways. 
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Over the past fifteen years a number of scholars in the field of security studies have suggested that the 
concept of ontological security, as developed through the work of R. D. Laing and Anthony Giddens, can 
help us to understand processes of identity formation and political violence in a manner more nuanced and 
substantive than conventional accounts of threat, identity and security. By placing attention on ‘the practices 
that social beings (individuals and groups) utilize to secure their sense of Self through time’ (Delehanty and 
Steele 2009: 524), these scholars have shown that we can learn something new about how the social relations 
which underpin political communities and differences operate.  
This article seeks to explore the relationship between ontological security and the politics of critique 
and, by extension, resistance. I argue that aspirations towards (or claims of) ontological security enact 
significant limitations on political critique and possibility, insofar as they close down the question of the 
subject precisely at the point where it might more productively be kept open. This functions both as a 
critique of everyday political practice and as a challenge to contemporary IR scholarship on ontological 
security, which works to order political subjectivity within an ontological security/insecurity episteme and 
thereby forecloses important spaces of resistance, alterity and ethical deliberation. I draw insights from 
feminist and queer theory, as well as examples from anti-militarist social movements, to uncover a tradition 
that engages with ontological security in an altogether different way. This alternative approach mobilises a 
politics of subjectivity which locates aspirations towards ontological security as forms of closure, and which 
instead embraces the subject’s opacity, contingency, non-innocence and even expendability; that is, it argues 
that radical political change comes precisely through deconstructing the terms of ontological security and 
insecurity. 
The article is divided into three parts. In the first, I look at the ways in which the concept 
ontological security has been developed, beginning with Laing’s psychoanalytic account and then moving 
to Giddens’ sociological formulation, before focusing on the ways in which ontological security has been 
mobilised by those working in security studies. The second part of the article introduces several critiques 
of ontological security-seeking behaviour. The first concerns the recognition that the process of achieving 
(or seeking to achieve) ontological security frequently involves forms of exclusion and othering which may 
be both violent and counter-productive. In Catarina Kinnvall’s terms, in seeking to escape a situation of 
ontological insecurity, actors may attempt to securitize subjectivity. Their attempts to do so and the 
contours within which such narratives are possible reveal the ways in which ontological security-providing 
narratives are embedded within relations of power. The second critique aims to approach such concerns 
from a different perspective. By counterpoising Laing’s conception of the subject with that of Judith Butler, 
I suggest that important ethico-political perspectives might be found by refusing the epistemic co-ordinates 
of ontological security/insecurity, and by seeking to affirm the subject’s failures, contradictions and 
opacities. The third critique engages with the more critical approach to ontological security outlined by 
Brent Steele, in order to demonstrate the ways in which an analytic framework based on ontological security 
and insecurity runs the risk of obscuring or disciplining the kinds of critique envisaged by Butler. 
The third part of the article builds on this point by highlighting practices and philosophies which 
affirm an alternative politics of subjectivity. I draw on Donna Haraway and Jack Halberstam’s queer 
figurations of subjectivity, and on the prefigurative ethos of grassroots anti-militarist activists, in order to 
show how conceptions of subjectivity which move beyond the terms of ontological security and insecurity 
offer more radical and substantive approaches to political critique. In highlighting them, my intention is 
not to suggest that analytical frameworks around ontological security have not been used in a productive 
manner, but rather that they enact certain limitations insofar as they tend to marginalise that which might 
more effectively be placed at the heart of critical analysis.  
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Ontological Security 
The intention of this article is to mobilise a critique of ordering political subjectivity within an ontological 
security/insecurity framework. As such, it might seem odd to begin with and place particular emphasis on 
Laing’s psychoanalytic foundation. His concern, as a practitioner, was with the conditions of schizophrenia 
and psychosis, rather than with the ethico-political coordinates of political subjectivity. However, Laing’s 
approach to psychoanalysis was an explicitly political one. He argued that mental disorders had social as 
well as biological causes, and that these could in part be traced to the tendency, as popular within psychiatry 
as amongst the general population, to depersonalize those suffering from mental disorders, to see them 
only through abstract categories, rather than to recognise them as ‘persons-in-the-world’.  
 Laing’s project in The Divided Self, where he introduced the concepts of ontological security and 
insecurity, was to conceptualise an existentialist approach to psychoanalysis. The task for such a 
psychoanalysis is not to ‘cure’ a patient (that is, to cause her to fit into pre-established categories of health) 
so much as to reconstruct ‘the patient’s way of being himself in his world’ (2010: 25). Laing advocated a 
form of psychiatry which involved the psychiatrist genuinely seeking to see the patient as a person, and to 
ask how her behaviour is expressive of her existence rather than merely signs of a disease. These concerns, 
which led to Laing becoming a leading figure in the anti-psychiatry movement, derived from his 
existentialist philosophical commitments; it is here that we find his foundational conception of subjectivity. 
He argues that ‘[t]he experience of oneself and others as persons is primary and self-validating. It exists 
prior to the scientific or philosophical difficulties about how such experience is possible or how it is to be 
explained’ (ibid., 23), and that ‘within the territory of ourselves there can be only our footprints’ (ibid., 37). 
 It is from these reference points that Laing introduces the concepts of ontological security and 
insecurity. He argues that psychosis and schizophrenia might occur when there is the ‘partial or almost 
complete absence of the assurances derived from an existential position of what I shall call primary ontological 
security: with anxieties and dangers that I shall suggest arise only in terms of primary ontological insecurity’ (ibid., 
39, emphasis in original). Of ontological security, Laing says: 
The individual…may experience his own being as real, alive, whole; as differentiated from the rest 
of the world in ordinary circumstances so clearly that his identity and autonomy are never in 
question; as a continuum in time; as having an inner consistency, substantiality, genuineness, and 
worth; as spatially coextensive with the body; and, usually, as having begun in or around birth and 
liable to extinction with death. He thus has a firm core of ontological security (ibid., 41-42). 
The ontologically insecure individual lacks these features; she does not have this stable sense of being. Laing 
continues: 
[The individual may feel] that his identity and autonomy are always in question. He may lack the 
experience of his own temporal continuity. He may not possess an over-riding sense of personal 
consistency or cohesiveness. He may feel more insubstantial than substantial, and unable to assume 
that the stuff he is made of is genuine, good, valuable (ibid., 42). 
Such is the condition of the ontologically insecure. An individual in such a state experiences the everyday 
world around herself as constantly and existentially threatening; she is perpetually faced with ‘the dread of 
losing the ‘self’’ (ibid., 49). She cannot cognitively organise changes and challenges such that she can adapt 
and respond (that is, cannot recognise her own autonomy); instead, she feels herself to be overwhelmed, 
undermined or petrified by them (ibid., 43-49). She cannot form relations with others because, in having 
no stable place from which to greet them, they have the capacity to engulf you (ibid., 52-53). Strategies to 
deal with this situation frequently exacerbate the problem, as the ontologically insecure individual retreats 
into herself, or attempts to depersonalise others so as to neutralise their existential threat. In lacking ‘a sense 
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of that basic unity which can abide through the most intense conflicts with oneself’ (ibid., 65), the 
ontologically insecure person is therefore deeply vulnerable to the experience of schizophrenia or psychosis. 
Against psychiatric convention, Laing’s schema does not establish particular grounds for designating health 
or sickness; instead, it seeks to outline a framework which might account for the fractures and traumas of 
certain forms of mental illness without enacting a depersonalisation liable merely to exacerbate the problem. 
From this point, some level of ontological security emerges as the precondition for meaningful personal 
and social interaction. 
 Giddens provides a sociological interpretation of Laing’s insights. He argues that ontological 
security depends on our ability to have faith in those social narratives and routines in which we are 
embedded and through which our self-identity is constituted, such that we are not obsessively preoccupied 
with their contingent and fragile nature. Whilst we can reflect upon such narratives (whether legal, cultural, 
existential), a certain measure of taking them for granted allows for a sense of agency, for a sense of identity 
from which we can engage socially (1991: 52). In understanding self-identity as something that is continually 
reproduced, the task for Giddens is not to ‘accept’ reality, but ‘to create ontological reference points as an 
integral aspect of “going on” in the contexts of day-to-day life’ (ibid., 48). The answers on which our 
ontological security rests are not stable and enduring truths of the self, but are produced and enshrined 
through routinized practices. The coherence of these practices, and the narrative around which they form, 
becomes central to an actor’s capacity to act, to have sufficient confidence in their space and narrative of 
being to make choices and interventions (ibid., 53-54). In placing certain assumptions and routines at the 
level of common sense, and in being able to trust in the stability of these routines, actors are able to build 
narratives, stories and plans without being perpetually confronted by the contingent nature of their 
foundations.  
Whilst Giddens’ explicit focus is on the experience of the individual, Croft notes that ‘for him that 
individual is one that is embedded into an intersubjective whole in the period of late modernity; the 
individual cannot be understood separately and asocially, and it is this commitment to routines that is part 
of the socialization of the individual’ (2012: 222). That is, the narratives which operate to ground our sense 
of ontological security are, whilst contingent, also fundamentally a part of our socio-political context (and 
horizon of possibilities). For both Laing and Giddens, then, the ontologically secure person has a stable 
sense of being, a certain measure of trust in the narratives on which that sense of being is established, and 
the ability to accept these narratives as contingent to some extent. This latter point is crucial. As Steele notes, 
the narratives on which we base our sense of ontological security are both rigid and fragile, able to provide 
a common sense upon which we can rely and yet also open to change and challenge (2005: 526). It is in this 
dynamic, for Giddens, that the ontologically secure person is able to realise a sense of agency. This dynamic 
also points towards the precarious nature of ontological security, another feature recognised by both Laing 
and Giddens. This precarity has been highlighted by a number of scholars working in security studies. 
 The study of ontological security in security studies has developed in a number of directions. Some 
have sought to scale the concept up to the level of the state (from Laing’s focus on the individual and 
Giddens’ sociological formulation), and so to consider how the state’s need for a stable sense of identity 
can be mobilised to explain particular policies, particularly those which might not accord naturally with 
traditional conceptions of security-as-survival (Mitzen 2006b: 342). For instance, Steele looks at how we 
might read Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation as a narrative which made British neutrality during the 
American Civil War a position motivated by the need for ontological security (arguably at the expense of 
traditional security) (2005), and elsewhere Jennifer Mitzen uses the concept to demonstrate the ways in 
which the EU collective identity is woven through routines of cooperation (rather than constituted by 
military power) (2006a). Others have criticised this approach. Alanna Krolikoswki argues that Giddens’ 
theory cannot be applied to corporate actors, and that it is at the social level that we might see the dynamics 
(and politics) of ontological security-seeking behaviour (for her, of Chinese Nationalism) as a powerful 
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explanatory framework (2008). Stuart Croft is also sceptical, suggesting that it would be misguided to 
‘separate the social institutions of the state from other social institutions’, and that ‘instead of reifying the 
state, ontological security studies should be based in understanding the intersubjective framing of the 
insecurities of individuals’ (2012: 225), a perspective he uses to explore the (in)securitization of British 
Muslims. What unites this work is a focus on the ways in which dynamics of stasis and change, crisis and 
normality, and inclusion and exclusion often depend on the (in)abilities of agents to maintain a stable sense 
of Self, to avoid the dread-laden petrification of ontological insecurity and build healthy routines on which 
to base their identities. It is from such a space that we can begin to build a critique of ontological security.  
  
The Subject of Ontological Security 
The intention in this article is to explore or provoke a sense of possibility, of flight from the terrain of 
ontological security/insecurity. My argument is that both the political aspiration towards ontological 
security, and the intellectual attempt to sort subjectivity within an ontological security/insecurity 
framework, perform particular limitations on the scope of ethico-political critique (and change). In 
recognising this, professions of and aspirations towards ontological security emerge as potent starting points 
for critique, as sites for perpetual and radical problematisation. It is precisely in developing a critical posture 
towards ontological security that a more radical politics of subjectivity can be mobilised. This second section 
outlines the critique which grounds this perspective. I argue that the focus placed on ‘biographical 
continuity’ (Giddens 1991: 53) and on convincing and solid narratives of the self (Kinnvall 2004: 746) might 
serve to obscure the ways in which these biographies and narratives are themselves important sites of 
ethico-political reflection and intervention, and that obscuring (or seeking to subdue) their fractured and 
multiple nature comes at a cost. In short, that the aspiration to ontological security tends to depoliticise the 
subject, to close the (political) question of being.  
 This critique is mobilised in three stages. The first, which draws on Kinnvall’s approach, explores 
the tendency for those seeking ontological security to ‘securitize subjectivity’, to enact a violent othering 
which denotes exclusionary and antagonistic differences. Such a perspective allows us to see the always-
already political co-ordinates of ontological security, and so the importance of adopting a critical stance. I 
argue that, whilst some moves to achieve or maintain ontological security are clearly more destructive than 
others, all enact certain limitations. In the second stage of the argument, I counterpoise Laing’s conception 
of primary ontological security with Butler’s reflections on the opacity of the subject. Butler’s argument 
that the subject’s non-autonomy and constitution within particular regimes of truth might stand as the 
starting point for political critique stands in direct contrast to Laing’s approach, further highlighting the 
issues which accompany aspirations towards ontological security. In the third stage, I engage with Steele’s 
more critical conception of ontological security. Whilst his account of ‘subjective flexibility’ offers some 
alternatives, their enclosure within an ontological security/insecurity framework reimposes particular 
boundaries.  
Kinnvall argues that, as an actor’s ontological insecurity increases in response to a challenge to their 
normal routines, they often ‘attempt to securitize subjectivity, which means an intensified search for one stable 
identity (regardless of its actual existence)’ (2004: 749, emphasis in original). This securitization tends to 
assert identity along axes of self and other in ways which achieve ontological security at the expense of 
those others. She looks at ways in which processes of globalization can lead to profound experiences of 
ontological insecurity, that is, ‘increasing rootlessness and loss of stability as people experience the effects 
of capitalist development, media overflow, structural adjustment policies, privatization, urbanization, 
unemployment, forced migration, and other similar transformative forces’ (ibid., 743).  
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Responses to the ontological insecurity which results from globalization founded in nationalism 
and religion offer a resistance rooted in a securitization of subjectivity. Kinnvall shows how the 
‘construction and reconstruction of historical symbols, myths, and chosen traumas supply alternative beliefs 
to everyday insecurity’, but that the  
…more inclusionary such beliefs are, the more exclusionary they tend to be for individuals or 
groups not included in the definition of these beliefs. The construction of self and other is therefore 
almost always a way to define superior and inferior beings...Increasing ontological security for one 
person or group by means of nationalist and religious myths and traumas is thus likely to decrease 
security for those not included in the nationalist and/or religious discourse (ibid., 763). 
For Kinnvall, this exclusionary securitization must be understood within Jef Huysmans’ conceptualisation 
of security as a thick signifier. This means that we must pay attention to what goes into the social narratives 
we construct around ourselves, the politics of our being; ‘A thick signifier approach highlights the 
intersubjective ordering of relations – that is, how individuals define themselves in relation to others 
according to their structural basis of power’ (ibid., 748). It reveals these boundaries within the wider onto-
political framework. The narrative on which ontological security rests is a political discourse with political 
effects, in the face of which we might ask: who is able to establish identity narratives? How do these 
narratives operate? Whose stability and sense of being is accommodated and even celebrated by such 
narratives? In such a context, ontological security and insecurity stand not as markers of stability and 
instability within a timeless and non-political episteme, but as political coordinates within a given 
framework, wherein particular narratives are established, particular exclusions necessitated, the logic and 
boundaries of subjectivity drawn.1 This does not mean that the insecurities caused by neoliberal 
globalization (for instance) are not real or in serious need of redress. Rather, it places attention on the 
politics of ontological security-seeking strategies, both insofar as some may, in their response to insecurity, 
be violent and/or counter-productive, and insofar as others may signal complicity or privilege within a 
violent social and political order. 
 Mitzen, taking Kinnvall’s concerns seriously, argues that not all attempts to seek ontological 
security securitize subjectivity. She does this by focusing on how we relate to our routines, distinguishing 
between approaches which fetishise the place of the routine, thereby closing down political contestation, 
and those more open responses which hold routine at a critical distance, conceptualising it as an important 
foundation for political agency while also subjecting it to some degree of reflexivity and political critique 
(2006a: 274).2 This is an important intervention, and saves ontological security-seeking behaviour from the 
possible (and misplaced) charge that it ignores the politics of identity. However, I would suggest that such 
responses overlook the depth of the relationship between politics, subjectivity and ontological security. 
Mitzen’s argument is that, 
With healthy basic trust, rather than avoiding disintegration, the actor can create or enact her 
identity(ies) and pursue her interests. Actors then can tolerate a certain measure of uncertainty; they do 
not respond to it by hardening self-boundaries, or ‘securitizing subjectivity’, but by, for example, 
reflecting on their practices and experimenting with new ones (ibid, emphasis added). 
The crucial point here is the reference to a ‘certain measure’ of uncertainty, a gesture which simultaneously 
opens and closes the space for problematisation, tolerating disruption only insofar as the subject remains, 
essentially, safe. 
                                                          
1 Also see Croft (2012: 225-232). 
2 Also see Steele (2005: 526-528; 2008: 57-63)  
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Mitzen conceptualises healthy basic trust as a feeling of being at home; ‘[a] home provides refuge 
from the threats and surveillance of the outside world. Homes provide constancy, stable spaces to perform 
the routines of daily life and thus to reproduce self-conceptions. Knowing there is a space in which it is 
possible to be one’s self provides the confidence necessary to assert one’s self and to experiment with new 
identities’ (ibid). The metaphor is powerful, but reveals the limitations of such a perspective insofar as it 
rarefies the experience of the home. This emerges when considered in contrast to Greg Noble’s reflections 
on the experience of migrant Australians and their sense of ontological security as related to the experience 
of ‘home’; as Noble argues, the ‘feeling of being at home’ is itself precisely a politicised and contingent 
space, a marker of exclusion, and a site of violence (2005). This is, of course, an insight with considerable 
precedence in feminist thought. ‘[S]table private space[s]’ are not insulated from the politics of identity or 
subjectivity. In fact, they are often the most powerful sites, precisely because they are the most hidden. The 
claim to ontological security, to a core space of being which operates as the condition of possibility for 
engaging with or encountering the world, is liable to foreclose the politics and power relations involved in 
the constitution of such spaces. The pragmatism which reserves a privileged safe space often masks 
precisely that point from which boundaries flow. 
 It is here that we might counterpoise Laing’s position with that of Butler. To do so, it is useful first 
to highlight several specific features of Laing’s conception of the ontologically secure subject. These derive 
from his existentialist phenomenology, and I highlight them not to suggest that all those who situate 
ontological security as an aspiration or precondition for political action share this philosophy so much as 
to demonstrate the ways in which an approach that begins with Butler might take us in a very different 
direction. These features are Laing’s conception of the ontologically secure subject as self-consciously 
authentic, consistent, and autonomous. As regards the first two, he writes that the ontologically secure 
person has ‘a sense of his presence in the world as real, alive, whole, and in a temporal sense, a continuous 
person’ and that this person encounters ‘all the hazards of life, social, ethical, spiritual, biological, from a 
centrally firm sense of his own and other people’s reality and identity’ (2010: 39). These operate as 
‘unquestionable self-validating certainties’ (ibid.). He further characterises such persons as ‘real and alive 
and complete’ (ibid., 40), as ‘having an inner consistency, substantiality, genuineness’ (ibid., 41), and as 
having a sense of ‘basic unity’ (ibid., 65). The ontologically secure subject has an identifiable, continuous 
and singular core, and they are aware of it as their core, as themselves.  
 The ontologically secure subject also experiences themselves as autonomous. Laing writes that their 
‘identity and autonomy are never in question’, whereas for the ontologically insecure their ‘identity and 
autonomy are always in question’ (ibid., 41-42). This is important, because a ‘firm sense of one’s own 
autonomous identity is required in order that one may be related as one human being to another’, and that 
‘uncertainty about the stability of [one’s] autonomy lays [one] open to the dread lest in any relationship 
[one] will lose [one’s] autonomy and identity’ (ibid., 44). Laing adds an important dimension to this 
conception of autonomy when he claims that ‘within the territory of ourselves there can be only our 
footprints’, that in a prior sense there is a core of our self which remains unimpeachably and untouchably 
us (ibid., 37). 
Whilst she never uses the term ontological security, I would suggest that we can read Butler as 
offering an account of the subject that stands in contrast to Laing’s authentic, autonomous 
conceptualisation here. In her 2007 book Giving and Account of Oneself, Butler restates the problems of 
ontological security in a manner which celebrates precisely that which Laing rejects, acknowledging the 
subject’s instability, non-autonomy and biographical incompleteness as a potent source for ethical 
reflection. Butler argues that there are five ‘vexations’ which interrupt our attempts to offer a coherent 
personal narrative, to achieve certain or true knowledge about ourselves: 
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There is (1) a non-narrativizable exposure that establishes my singularity, and there are (2) primary 
relations, irrecoverable, that form lasting and recurrent impressions in the history of my life, and so 
(3) a history that establishes my partial opacity to myself. Lastly, there are (4) norms that facilitate my 
telling about myself but that I do not author...[and]...(5) the structure of address in which [my account] 
takes place (2005: 39, emphasis in original).  
Butler disagrees with the charge that a perspective which decenters the subject undermines the capacity for 
ethical deliberation, arguing that, on the contrary, the opacity of the subject to itself might offer a fruitful 
space from which to begin to think about ethics and responsibility. This is because this opacity signifies the 
non-autonomy of the subject, highlighting its foundations in and dependence on others, its essential 
relationality (ibid., 19-20). Our ‘”incoherence” establishes the way in which we are constituted in 
relationality: implicated, beholden, derived, sustained by a social world that is beyond us and before us’ 
(ibid., 64). This is not supposed to deny that some degree of self-knowledge is vital, but that it is limited, 
that it is in my foreignness to myself that I find ‘the source of my ethical connection with others’ (ibid., 84). 
Attempts to impose coherent narratives over this opacity run the risk of foreclosing important ethical 
resources, privileging that which accords with dominant narratives over ‘moments of interruption, 
stoppage, open-endedness – in enigmatic articulations that cannot easily be translated into narrative form’ (ibid., 
63-4, emphasis added). Butler, then, establishes a powerful framework from which to think the problem of 
narrative and identity, suggesting that it is from the incompleteness of these that we should proceed.  
Butler’s contribution, however, does not end here: there is a more explicit (Foucauldian) politics 
in her move to displace the authentic and autonomous subject. She notes that to  
…call into question a regime of truth, where that regime of truth governs subjectiviation, is to call 
into question the truth of myself and, indeed, to question my ability to tell the truth about myself, 
to give an account of myself...if I question the regime of truth, I question, too, the regime through 
which being, and my own ontological status, is allocated. Critique is not merely of a given social 
practice or a certain horizon of intelligibility within which practices and institutions appear, it also 
implies that I come into question for myself (ibid., 23).  
Political critique cannot be held at a safe distance, nor grounded in a knowing and coherent subject; it must 
hold the subject in existential contingency, as a problem for politics. To think otherwise is to impose a 
narrative which expels responsibility in the service of security, refuses to take account of interconnectedness 
through a mastery of narrative. Butler makes this point powerfully when diagnosing practices of judgment. 
She argues that ‘[c]ondemnation, denunciation, and excoriation work as quick ways to posit an ontological 
difference between judge and judged, even to purge oneself of another...we establish the other as 
nonrecognizable or jettison some aspect of ourselves that we lodge in the other, whom we then condemn...it 
moralizes a self by disavowing commonality with the judged’ (ibid., 46). Butler argues that an ethics of 
responsibility needs to remain sceptical of such practices, keeping the question of the subject radically open. 
She is careful to acknowledge that such a responsibility does not operate along lines wherein we believe 
ourselves to be intertwined with or responsible for every act of violence: ‘guilt of this sort exacerbates our 
sense of omnipotence, sometimes under the very sign of its critique’ (ibid., 101). Rather, she seeks, in 
Levinasian terms, an infinite responsibility which takes account of our shared norms, regimes and 
narratives, and which therefore prioritises explorations (and disruptions) of relationality and subjectiviation. 
In the context of this article, Butler’s approach has force insofar as it demands a politicisation of 
ontological narrative, foreclosure and differentiation. The pre-established or prior contours of the subject 
are a limited and limiting space from which to begin ethical reflection; indeed, it is the terrain of these 
contours themselves, and those auto-narratives which are most easily accepted, which most easily ‘fit’ within 
dominant regimes of truth, which might provoke the injunction to problematise. To proceed otherwise is 
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to conduct a politics which proceeds within, rather than as critical engagement with, onto-political logics. In 
this sense, ontological security-seeking behaviour should be challenged as a project which interrupts spaces 
of relationality and responsibility, and forecloses the question of the subject. Those features which Laing 
holds most central, authenticity and autonomy, are precisely those which should be deferred: in relying 
upon existential safe spaces, the subject’s sovereignty remains unchallenged, and critique is disciplined 
within familiar boundaries.  
In his 2008 book Ontological Security in International Relations Steele develops a conception of 
ontological security which incorporates some of these concerns. He acknowledges that the experience of 
existential anxiety is an inescapable feature of the human condition (2008: 61) and that, whilst we can 
impose some routinized order on this anxiety, we can never truly be ontologically secure (ibid., 48). Rather 
than view this as a problem, however, it is precisely this understanding that gives energy to Steele’s account. 
The constant angst that the subject experiences, caught between necessary but artificial routines and a more 
fundamental but formless sense of the self, constitutes a dialectic that ‘provides agents with the ability to 
abandon those intrinsic elements which contaminate the realization of a healthy sense of ontological 
security’ (ibid., 63). Beyond Mitzen’s ‘flexible routines’, Steele invokes a form of ‘subjective flexibility’, 
which eschews safe spaces and completeness in favour of a more ‘radical disruption of the self’ (ibid., 55). 
This flexibility accommodates an approach to moral obligation which refuses to shield the subject (ibid., 
46-48), in a manner which bears some resemblance to my argument here.  
Steele’s account, acknowledging the always-political and always-contested nature of ontological 
security narratives, is both highly nuanced and often persuasive.3 However, even his more critical account 
imposes certain limitations, which can be framed both politically and analytically. In political terms, whilst 
Steele acknowledges that important resources come from the subject’s impossible relationship with 
ontological security, these are set out in a manner which still holds ontological security as a guiding 
aspiration. The values of angst, contradiction, opacity and non-autonomy are thus subordinated, 
conceptualised as impediments to being which might (usefully) be traversed en route to an authentic, 
autonomous whole. Safe space, coherence and truth remain the goal, wholeness the horizon. Whilst Steele 
looks optimistically for the virtues that might flow from this perpetually frustrated process, I would argue 
that, within such a framework, strategies which offset, pacify or straightforwardly ignore the non-innocence 
of the subject become all but certain.  
In analytical terms, Steele’s project folds a mass of political contestations within a framework of 
ontological security and insecurity, outlining a wide range of strategies (primarily of state representatives, 
but also of NGOs, social movements, international organisations and others) as attempts to respond to 
ontological insecurity, or to achieve or preserve ontological security. Whilst this analysis generates important 
insights, it also positions things in a binary (or dialectical) framework where it may be more productive to 
look at that which resists such a binary. The binary analytic writes out (or disciplines) those movements, 
agents and practices which cut across, move beyond or disrupt the terrain of ontological in/security, which 
demonstrate alternative conceptions of critical subjectivity that take the contours of ontological security as 
their object, and which explore modes of becoming beyond these terms. The third and final section of this 
paper explores precisely such interventions.  
 
Resisting Ontological Security 
                                                          
3 A similar argument is made in Delehanty and Steele (2009: 531-556). I would also suggest that Chris Browning and 
Pertti Joenniemi’s work outlining ‘non-securitizing’ approaches to ontological security (2012), and Kinnvall and Jitka 
Lindén’s work on dialogical selves (2010), take us in similar directions, whilst being open to the same criticisms.  
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Thus far, I have argued that framing political action and possibility within the terms of ontological security 
and insecurity imposes certain limits. The final section of this article outlines several ways in which political 
interventions can be seen to take place beyond or in contestation with such limits. Doing so challenges 
assumptions that ontological security is an obvious or universal aspiration, demonstrates that more critical 
or radical political projects can emerge from such a posture, and reveals the analytical limitations of 
approaches which tend to fold activity and contestation exclusively within an ontological security/insecurity 
episteme. The first part looks at how the queer figurations of subjectivity mobilised by Donna Haraway 
and Jack Halberstam offer resources beyond the terms of ontological security and insecurity. In the second, 
I look at how these disruptions can be located in existing social movements. Engaging with examples from 
anti-militarist social movements, I argue that their focus on militarized subjectivity, radical understandings 
of autonomy, and their prefigurative practice of resistance demonstrates an approach to political 
contestation that cannot be adequately captured within an ontological security/insecurity framework. 
Indeed, it should be understood precisely on the terms that it deconstructs such a framework.  
Whilst not necessarily expressed in these terms, many critical political traditions have advocated a 
subversive posture with regards to ontological security and insecurity. This can emerge in the name of ethics 
(Butler 2007, Anzaldua 2007), survival (Malkki 1995), radical creativity (Bertalan 2011, Rossdale 2015) and 
more. Queer Theory in particular provides resources for reimagining the subject in this fashion, precisely 
because those working in this field have looked to denaturalise the supposedly stable identities and binaries 
which constitute contemporary sexual and gender identities. The essential instability of such identities, and 
the manifold violences involved in the imposition of stable narratives, provokes the exploration of identities 
which offend against the terms of ontological security and insecurity. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s definition 
of queer as ‘the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses 
of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t 
be made) to signify monolithically’ (1994: 8, emphasis in original) elegantly places queerness in contrast to 
the stabilities and continuities of ontological security.  
Two significant queer interventions help to demonstrate how such approaches seek to 
conceptualise (and practice) disruptive modes of subjectivity. They stand alongside Butler’s account of the 
opaque subject as interventions which seek to conceptualise the fractured, incoherent, incomplete nature 
of being not as impediments to be overcome, but as points from which to explore. In her famous ‘Cyborg 
Manifesto’ Haraway offers tools for thinking about the politics and possibilities of the contradictory, partial 
and incoherent subject. She blends social theory and science fiction in order to provoke imagination about 
the possibilities for subjectivities not bounded by rationalist ontologies, subjectivities for whom the 
impossibility of ontological security is the very condition of possibility for meaningful political life: 
By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated 
hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us 
our politics. The cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two 
joined centres structuring any possibility of historical transformation (1991: 150). 
The cyborg is an ironic creature, which affirms ‘contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even 
dialectically’, and which holds ‘incompatible things together because both or all are necessary or true’ (ibid., 
149); the ‘cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity. It is oppositional, 
utopian, and completely without innocence’ (ibid., 151). In a cyborg world, people are ‘not afraid of 
permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints...Single vision produces worse illusions than 
double vision or many-headed monsters. Cyborg unities are monstrous and illegitimate’ (ibid., 154).  
In looking for a politics that could ‘embrace partial, contradictory, permanently unclosed 
constructions of personal and collective selves’ and which remains nonetheless ‘faithful, effective – and, 
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ironically, socialist-feminist’ (ibid., 157), Haraway remains painfully aware of the ways in which we have 
been produced as subjects within particular regimes. She argues that ‘[w]e are excruciatingly conscious of 
what it means to have a historically constituted body. But with the loss of innocence in our origin, there is 
no expulsion from the Garden either. Our politics lose the indulgence of guilt with the naïvité of innocence’ 
(ibid.), and that 
“we” cannot claim innocence from practising...dominations. White women, including socialist 
feminists, discovered (that is, were forced kicking and screaming to notice) the non-innocence of 
the category ‘woman’. That consciousness changes the geography of all previous categories; it 
denatures them as heat denatures a fragile protein...Innocence, and the corollary insistence on 
victimhood as the only ground for insight, has done enough damage (ibid.).  
This does not mean that we are trapped, but it does mean that we have to take the subject as the object of 
critique. From such spaces, for Haraway, there is always possibility; ‘[t]he main trouble with cyborgs...is that 
they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism...But illegitimate offspring are 
often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential’ (ibid., 151).  
Haraway cautions that, in seeking to find strategies for intervention which do not follow the route 
taken by much of 20th century radicalism in reasserting the place of stable and totalising categories, ‘we risk 
lapsing into boundless difference and giving up on the confusing task of making partial, real connection’ 
(ibid., 160-161). Taking the lines of ontological differentiation as political boundaries, and holding 
ontological security-seeking behaviour in critical space, does not mean the suspension of drawing such lines; 
to do so would itself be a depoliticising move, in which the creative moments vital for resistance are 
endlessly deferred.  
 What we get from Haraway is an approach to resistance which holds the subject in a ceaseless and 
creative irony, an ontological dissonance or discomfort which celebrates incompleteness and expendability 
as the precondition of otherness. In this sense, a refusal of ontological security-seeking behaviour becomes 
a deeply creative commitment, a ceaseless experimentation which seeks to break down dominant regimes 
by exploring alternative relations and ways of being. The ceaselessness and contradictory nature of such 
resistance seeks to avoid establishing new stabilities, instead fostering spaces in which subjectivity remains 
an open (and political) question, in which narratives of security fail to impose themselves and depoliticise 
ontology. 
 Halberstam’s work on failure takes us in a different direction. In spite of a political and social 
culture obsessed with success, winning and victories, he recovers ‘the queer art of failure’, an ironic but 
perfectly serious posture which affirms fracture, breakage and incoherence. Where dominant standards of 
success so frequently reflect particular configurations of (capitalist, heteronormative, patriarchal) power, 
‘failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, 
more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world…failure allows us to escape the punishing 
norms that discipline behaviour and manage human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly 
childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods’ (2011: 2-3). Against the demands for a good, coherent 
story about ourselves, for authenticity and for stability, Halberstam invites us to take (and even enjoy) our 
ontological failures as starting points for an alternative ethics of the self. 
 Amongst a number of concepts (including stupidity, incoherence and incompleteness), Halberstam 
rehabilitates the practice of forgetting. He suggests that for ‘women and queer people, forgetfulness can be 
a useful tool for jamming the smooth operations of the normal and the ordinary’ (ibid., 70). Whilst 
forgetfulness can be a mode of domination, it can also (when mobilised by those for whom continuity 
signifies subjugation) become ‘a rupture with the eternally self-generating present, a break with a self-
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authorizing past, and an opportunity for a non-hetero-reproductive future’. Alongside other examples, this 
point is illustrated through a reading of the film Finding Nemo, specifically as regards the character Dory, 
who suffers from short-term memory loss: 
Dory’s forgetfulness does more than simply interrupt the Oedipal relationship. She actually signals 
a new version of selfhood, a queer version that depends upon disconnection from the family and 
contingent relations to friends and improvised relations to community. In fact, because of her 
short-term memory loss she actively blocks the transformation of Marlin, Nemo, and herself into 
nuclearity; she is not Nemo’s mother substitute nor Marlin’s new wife, she cannot remember her 
relation to either fish, and so she is forced, and happily so, to create relation anew every five minutes 
or so. Forgetfulness has long been associated with radical action and a revolutionary relation to the 
now. The situationists understood themselves to be “partisans of forgetting,” allowing them to 
“forget the past” and “live in the present.” Furthermore situationists saw forgetting as the weapon 
of the proletariat, who have no past and for whom the choice is only and always “now or never. 
Dory links this radical forgetting as a break with history to a notion of queer forgetting within 
which the forgetful subject, among other things, forgets family and tradition and lineage and 
biological relation and lives to create relationality anew in each moment and for each context and 
without a teleology and on behalf of the chaotic potentiality of the random action (ibid., 80). 
Dory’s lack of ontological security, of consistent, temporally continuous, reflexive answers about herself, 
of a stable sense of being, is not a reason for dread, nor does it foreclose the possibility for social relations. 
Indeed, it multiplies them dramatically, in the process calling us to consider other forms of radical 
forgetting. This does not ignore the fact that forgetting can be a traumatic or violent act; it does, however, 
suggest that the field of possibility is not so obviously contained. 
 The poetics of Haraway and Halberstam provide two provocative routes for thinking subjectivities 
against and beyond the terms of ontological security/insecurity. However, such disruptions are not 
confined to textual explorations; they can be identified in everyday social movement practices. The 
following discussion highlights some key features of anti-militarist resistance, arguing that we can view them 
both as critically engaging with the subject, and as doing so in a manner which continually disrupts the 
terrain of ontological security.  
To begin, it is important to understand the ways in which anti-militarists conceptualise militarism 
beyond traditional understandings, that is, beyond a series of institutions which facilitate the conduct of 
violence and warfare. Whilst such features are clearly important, anti-militarists also understand militarism 
as a form of subjectivity. As one pamphlet writer puts it,  
…militarism is not just war as such. It is a social hierarchy of order givers and order takers. It is 
obedience, domination and submission. It is the capacity to perceive other human beings as 
abstractions, mere numbers, death counts. It is, at the same time, the domination of strategic 
considerations and efficiency for its own sake over life and the willingness to sacrifice oneself for 
a ‘Great Cause’ that one has been taught to believe in’ (Landstreicher 2009: 85).   
Such conceptualisations have significant implications for resistance.4 Merely targeting institutional 
arrangements is insufficient; resistance to militarism entails a critical engagement with abstraction and 
calculation, with the place and flow of authority and obedience, with the ways in which subjectivity is 
implicated in, constituted through and performative of precisely that which is resisted. There is no safe 
space; in the words of one female Turkish conscientious objector, ‘Militarism is always like a unannounced 
                                                          
4 Feminist IR scholars have made very similar arguments. See Spike Peterson 2010; Sjoberg 2007; Cohn 2000; Enloe 
1989: 93-123. 
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and shameless guest in every aspect of life [sic]’ (Ülker 2010: 110). Resistance must therefore take the subject 
as an object of critique, recognising its contours as themselves complicit in the performance of those social 
relations and imaginaries which make militarism possible. Failure to do so leaves too much intact. As 
Landstreicher goes on to argue, ‘destructive attack is a legitimate and necessary response [to militarised 
institutions]. But to militarize this struggle, to transform it essentially into a question of strategies and tactics, 
of opposing forces and numbers, is to begin to create within our struggle that which we are trying to destroy’ 
(2009: 86).  
Such understandings led Philip Berrigan, a Catholic priest who helped to form the ‘Plowshares’ 
movement and who spent time in prison for breaking into military bases and physically dismantling military 
equipment, to view resistance as a process fundamentally concerned with demilitarising the self: ‘We try to 
disarm ourselves by disarming the missiles’ (cited in Laffin 2003: 3). Similarly, Estefanía Gómez Vásquez 
describes being a conscientious objector as ‘inscribing a different history on my body’ (2010: 136). In order 
to challenge militarism, those very narratives which constitute the reference points for ontological security 
must be called into question; the subject’s opacities, imbrications, contradictions and violent foundations 
must be brought to the fore. As Haraway writes, ‘I have a body and mind as much constructed by the post-
Second World War arms race and cold war as by the women’s movements’ (1991: 173), an insight that 
stands in significant contrast with Laing’s claim that ‘within the territory of ourselves there can be only our 
footprints’ (2010: 37). 
This alone does not mark all aspirations towards ontological security as problematic, or function 
to criticise those analyses which fold contestation within an ontological security/insecurity framework. As 
Steele shows, an ontological security analytic can reveal the ways in which social movements highlight the 
violences of particular identity narratives and aide in the construction of new narratives (and practices) (2008: 
152-153). Indeed, it is on such terms that he elsewhere analyses the anti-militarist campaign of Cindy 
Sheehan (Steele 2010: 49-50). However, such analyses have significant limitations with respect to the ways 
in which disruptions to ontological security narratives are folded back into the process of subjectification. 
In Steele’s formulation, there is a place for deconstruction, but it is always directed towards the resolution 
of the (unity of the) Self (2008: 65). Although Steele acknowledges and celebrates the fact that such 
resolution is impossible, its status as the horizon of possibility (the consequence of an ontological 
security/insecurity analytic) encloses the nature of critical subjectivity. In looking beyond such terms, we 
can see social movements not only contesting or deconstructing particular subjectivities and narratives, but 
precisely advocating a more deconstructive attitude towards subjectivity itself. 
This can be seen in the prefigurative ethos that runs through many anti-militarist spaces. 
‘Prefigurative’ politics refers to those traditions which seek, for ethical, political and ontological reasons, to 
reflect the change desired in the means used to achieve it, to begin to build a new world in the shell of the 
old (Maeckelbergh 2011). In the context of anti-militarism it refers to the manifold attempts to operate in 
ways which do not reproduce militarised subjectivities. Anti-militarists actively seek to subvert forms of 
organisation based on authority and submission, on abstraction, and on sovereign community, and to 
experiment with alternative forms of relationality and community; new subjectivities. 
Decisions are made by consensus, as groups seek to displace the exclusions and atomisations of 
traditional forms of deliberation (Rossdale 2013: 167-172; Graeber 2009: 287-358). Peace camps are 
organised along non-hierarchical lines (with varying degrees of success), in ways which disrupt logics of 
obedience and authority and which provide spaces for experimentation with alternative forms of relation 
and exchange (Rossdale 2013: 137-141; Sylvester 1992: 168; Cockburn 2012: 37-38). Activists recognise the 
power of internalised respect for authority and, further disrupting militarised logics of obedience, practice 
disobeying orders from the police and security guards in order to carry out protest actions more effectively 
(Rossdale 2013: 173-179); and in understanding the ways in which certain gendered identities intersect with 
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state-military orders, activists work to both highlight such operations while exploring and challenging their 
own gendered performances (Rossdale 2013: 183-191: Cockburn 2012).  
Pertinently, such experiments are frequently enacted under the banner of autonomy, a signifier 
which affirms the desire on the part of activists to organise without a hierarchical structure or hegemonic 
standard of legitimacy, whether in the form of the state or the party. However, I would suggest that this 
autonomy is not the ‘genuine privacy’ Laing invokes (2010: 37), which designates a space, coalition or 
subject as separate from or innocent in the performance of militarised social relations. Rather, activist 
conceptions might be seen in the sense suggested by Stevphen Shukaitis, who argues that autonomy 
is not something that is possessed by an individual subject so much as a relation created between 
subjects; that is, it is a form of sociality and openness to the other created through cooperative 
relations…Autonomy is more a notion that is useful in the mutual shaping and crafting of the 
social field, rather than something that precedes it (2009: 18).  
Saul Newman is on similar territory when he argues that ‘by autonomy, I do not mean a fully achieved 
situation of freedom and independence, but rather an ongoing project, a continual invention and 
experimentation with new practices of freedom, conducted associatively, producing alternative ethical 
relations between the self and others’ (2012: 277). In such a context, rather than a property or ontologically 
prior condition of interrelation, autonomy becomes a ceaseless project of exploration, identification, and 
experimentation. It is indissociable from attempts to explore logics of subjectification, insofar as it demands 
that we interrogate the processes through which our relationality (and therefore responsibility) is 
constituted, and look to build projects which ceaselessly interrupt our selves. Such conceptions are clearly 
at odds with Laing’s; this is important not only because, in calling for a sense of autonomy which perpetually 
disrupts the narratives through which it is constituted, it signifies alternatives beyond the terms of 
ontological security/insecurity. It is important because it reveals Laing’s conception of autonomy as 
precisely political, keeping that safe which might more productively be called into question. As Christine 
Sylvester makes clear, the history of the autonomous, self-determining, non-dependent subject is in many 
ways precisely the history of the militarised (and masculinised) subject (1992).  
A similar argument should be made with respect to prefiguration. The attempt to prefigure 
alternative subjectivities is not a linear or idealistic procession towards more perfect selves. In seeking to 
fashion alternatives to militarism, activists frequently fail, as hierarchies form in purported spaces of non-
hierarchy, alternative decision making practices break down, and militarised masculinities emerge. In 
Halberstam’s shadow, such ‘failures’ might be recognised as fresh opportunities for learning and resistance, 
wherein the depth of our imbrications are revealed. Such a process is necessarily difficult; as one activist 
states, ‘[d]ealing with our own alienation and conditioning is a very hard and unromantic task, which has 
no room for heroes and martyrs…chucking a brick through a pane of glass or building an incendiary device 
is piss easy in comparison’ (cited in Abramsky 2001: 563).  
The experiments are not pointless (and are often highly effective), but neither are they perfect; 
prefiguration does not signify an unproblematic configuration of means in accordance with already-known 
ends, but a dynamic interplay whereby speculative experiments in alternatives to militarism are explored 
and deconstructed in the process of action. As a process, it demands its own perpetuity; to believe oneself 
to have succeeded or arrived is (as with autonomy) to proceed a manner which overlooks the manifold 
ways in which one is always folded within relations of power. Nonetheless prefiguration retains a creative 
spirit which, in Haraway’s terms, affirms contradiction and non-innocence as opportunities to fashion new 
selves which don’t coalesce into new totalities. It is an ethos of critique and of subjectivity which recognises 
that it is often our common sense narratives and practices which must be interrogated and called into 
question. It therefore takes energy from a suspicious stance towards claims of or aspirations towards 
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ontological security, and in demanding a perpetual experimentation and politicisation, works to resist 
enclosure within the terms of the wider dialectic. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article I have sought to highlight the limits of a political imaginary based on ontological security and 
insecurity. This critique has been targeted both at conceptions of political action which hold ontological 
security as an aspiration, and at analytical perspectives which impose an ontological security/insecurity 
framework. In challenging ontological security-seeking behaviour, my intention has not been to reverse the 
dichotomy, but to highlight some ways in which particular limitations are placed on the scope of ethical 
and political critique (and resistance) when we think within such an imaginary. In Huysmans’ terms, my 
argument ‘is not a celebration of the reign of the undetermined – of ontological insecurity as such – which 
would be a reign of chaos. It is a (plea for the) search for new life strategies which would not exclude death 
from life but which would emphasize a life within ambivalence’ (1998: 247). 
 I have made three arguments. The first is that attempts to achieve ontological security are often 
violent or othering, drawing lines of exclusion in an attempt to securitize subjectivity. Whilst some 
responses are clearly more dangerous than others, none can claim innocence. This latter point emerges 
when we conceptualise ontological security not as an abstract psychological experience, but as an 
accordance with wider political and social frameworks, wherein comfort frequently signifies some degree 
of privilege and/or complicity. The second argument builds on this first to suggest that important resources 
might in fact come from taking a suspicious stance towards the contours of ontological security. Mobilising 
Butler, I suggested that it is in our discontinuities, opacities and non-autonomies, our impossible 
relationship with ontological security, that we might locate our ethical and political obligations and 
recognise the ways in which our subjectivity is implicated within dominant regimes. Such a perspective 
demands a politics of subjectivity that remains deeply suspicious of aspirations towards ontological security: 
an approach which seeks to overcome such ruptures, to adapt only insofar as they can be pacified, cannot 
take them to its core. 
 The third argument is that such problems exist not only for ontological security-seeking behaviour, 
but for analytical frameworks which mobilise an ontological security/insecurity episteme (and therefore for 
much of the academic work on the subject). Whilst this work does have significant explanatory potential, 
it also performs certain limitations. By sorting political action within a landscape wherein processes of 
change, stasis, resistance, exclusion, and self-development are conceptualised insofar as they demonstrate 
types of response to ontological (in)security, such approaches fail to make space for political practices which 
resist the framework and which explore alternative politics of subjectivity. I would suggest that such 
practices exemplify some particularly incisive forms of critique and resistance, and therefore that the 
ontological security/insecurity framework emerges as having a somewhat conservative foundation. That is, 
it remarginalises that which might more productively be placed at the centre of critical analysis. 
 My intention in this article is neither to disregard the traumas of ontological insecurity, nor to make 
the claim that all aspirations to or senses of ontological security are straightforwardly bad. Rather, it is to 
insist that an account of subjectivity which places ontological security and insecurity as the sole axes of 
possibility is severely limiting. I have suggested that explorations and critical postures beyond these terms 
can be conceptualised, in part by placing attention on precisely that which ontological security offsets: 
opacity, contradiction, non-autonomy, failure. Against such conceptualisations, we might think more about 
those accounts which take these contradictions and complexities into the heart of becoming, which provoke 
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restless and incomplete subjects and which seek to creatively unsettle the margins of ontological 
security/insecurity. 
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